

EmPowerIngUs

Innovation Transfer Network **EmPowerIngUs** Network Final Report



URBACT



Co-funded by
the European Union
Interreg

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** All information, data and visual material used in this document were provided by EmPowerIngUs Project Partners or developed by the EmPowerIngUs Lead Expert and Ad-hoc Experts.*

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Who we are and where we come from

EmPowerIngUs is an [URBACT Innovation Transfer Network](#) built around the Energy Poverty Intelligence Unit (EPIU) developed in Getafe, Spain, through the [Urban Innovative Actions programme](#) and later recognised as an URBACT Good Practice.



Between 2024 and 2026, Getafe worked with four transfer cities – Maia (Portugal), Trikala (Greece), Pomorie (Bulgaria) and Etterbeek (Belgium) to explore whether the experience, methods and solutions developed through EPIU could be transferred and adapted to very different European urban contexts.

1.2 Why we care

The issue of “energy poverty” is much more than just difficulty of paying a monthly energy bill. It is shaped by the interaction between household circumstances, housing conditions, energy performance, access to support and the capacity of public institutions to identify and respond to vulnerability. EPIU was developed to move municipal action from predominantly reactive assistance towards a more proactive, people-centred and data-informed approach, connecting better knowledge of visible and hidden energy poverty with trusted services and tailored interventions.

EmPowerIngUs therefore became much more than just a test of whether individual EPIU solutions could travel. It offered an opportunity to understand how complex urban innovation travels – what can be transferred, what needs adaptation, what requires more time and what cities can learn from one another in the process.

By the end of this journey, these experiences had also been distilled into the [EmPowerIngUs Philosophy – a set of shared principles for tackling energy poverty](#) that reflects what partners learned about people, data, trust, cooperation and adaptation. We return to these principles throughout the report as one of the network’s main legacies.

1.3 Key questions we will respond to

This report tells that journey through three simple questions:

- Can an innovative approach, developed in Getafe, also perform in very different European cities?
- What needs to change when a Good Practice travels?
- What can other cities learn from the way EmPowerIngUs understood, tested and adapted the EPIU Good Practice?

Rather than documenting every project activity, **the report focuses on** the choices, changes, results and lessons learned that shaped five different local pathways – and on **what they can offer to other urban practitioners interested in transferring innovation.**

Prepared in September 2026

EmPowerIngUs project Lead Expert: Klemen Strmšnik

2. OUR ROOTS

2.1 Getafe's Energy Poverty Intelligence Unit and its core logic

EPIU originated from a simple but demanding ambition: identify and respond not only to visible energy poverty, but also to households whose vulnerability remains hidden from conventional support systems.

Getafe combined socio-economic, energy and building information to improve its understanding of vulnerability and developed an integrated response around three main components: an Intelligence Unit, the Healthy Homes Office as a One-Stop-Shop, and a set of Tailor-Made Solutions at household, building and neighbourhood scales.

The innovation was therefore not AI or data alone. Its core logic connected knowledge, trusted human support and appropriate action, supported by collaboration between social, housing, energy, technical and other municipal actors. Importantly, EPIU itself evolved during implementation as data-access, GDPR and interoperability challenges demonstrated that innovation rarely follows its original design unchanged.

2.2 Transfer cities and their starting positions

EmPowerIngUs deliberately brought together cities with very different capacities and realities. The Transferability Study confirmed that each had assets to build on, but also distinct gaps that would influence its transfer ambitions.

- **Getafe** – the source and innovator: an established Good Practice to consolidate, upgrade and further evolve.
- **Maia** – strong but fragmented capacities: Smart City infrastructure, municipal and community experience and existing energy initiatives, alongside data, staffing and coordination challenges.
- **Trikala** – strong digital foundations and emerging energy services: considerable data and Smart City experience combined with the need to strengthen awareness, cooperation and dedicated responses to energy poverty.
- **Pomorje** – the lowest initial transfer baseline: strong commitment and project experience, but limited local data, specialised staff and dedicated energy-poverty mechanisms.
- **Etterbeek** – the most advanced transfer-city starting point: existing energy and social-support services and an experienced stakeholder ecosystem, but continued constraints around data, specialised capacity and finance.

2.3 Could the EPIU good practice approach work outside Getafe?

This diversity exposed the central question behind EmPowerIngUs. EPIU had been developed over several years and was deeply rooted in Getafe's own institutional structures, data environment, neighbourhoods and stakeholder relationships. The four transfer cities were working with different legislation, administrative arrangements, levels of technical capacity, access to data, existing services and financial resources – and within a considerably shorter transfer period.

The ambition was therefore not to recreate the complete Getafe model within each city. Instead, **EmPowerIngUs set out to explore which parts of the EPIU approach could travel, under what conditions, and how they could become meaningful in very different local realities.** Partners needed to understand which elements could be taken forward during the network, which would require longer-term development, and where existing local capacities could provide a different route towards the same objective.

The fundamental question was therefore not simply *“Can EPIU be copied elsewhere?”* It was: *“What makes the Good Practice transferable – and how much can its form change while its underlying purpose remains intact?”*

Answering that question required the partnership first to understand exactly what was being transferred. And that is where our transfer journey began. ...

3. OUR TRANSFER PROCESS

3.1 Understand before you transfer

The first challenge for EmPowerIngUs was not implementation – it was **understanding what exactly was being transferred**. [Getafe's EPIU Good Practice](#) had been developed over several years, with considerably more time and resources than were available within the Innovation Transfer Network. It combined data and AI, interdepartmental cooperation, a One-Stop-Shop, awareness raising, household-, building- and neighbourhood-level interventions, and a wider ecosystem of municipal and external actors. Treating this as one indivisible model would have made meaningful transfer almost impossible.

GOOD PRACTICE MODULES		
INITIAL TRANSFER	Active partnership establishment and management	
	Knowledge transfer	
	Encouraging and improving cooperation within city administration	
	Preliminary testing with first and second level data collection	
	Awareness raising	
LONG-TERM TRANSFER	Development of baseline studies	
	One-stop shop establishment	
	One-stop-shop services (soft measures)	Household level
		Buildings level
		Neighbourhoods level
	Third party solutions (Hard measures)	Household level
		Buildings level
		Neighbourhoods level
	Third level data collection and AI modelling	
	Improved AI modelling	
UP-GRADE	Energy Communities	

The network therefore started by **deconstructing the Good Practice**. EPIU was divided into modules and then into concrete development steps, allowing partners to understand not only individual solutions but also their sequencing, interdependencies and resource requirements. These were grouped into three broad categories: Initial Transfer Modules, which could realistically be explored or implemented during EmPowerIngUs; Long-Term Transfer Modules, representing more complete adoption requiring additional time, resources or preconditions; and Upgrade Modules, through which Getafe and the transfer cities could jointly explore the further evolution of EPIU.

This structure was not developed behind a desk. The Deep Dive Meeting in Getafe gave transfer partners direct access to the people, places and mechanisms behind EPIU: data and interdepartmental cooperation, vulnerability assessment, soft measures, ULG management and interventions at building and neighbourhood level. **Partners were then asked to consider their own transfer ambitions rather than simply react to a finished offer.**

Municipal teams and stakeholders examined local energy-poverty challenges, available data, existing services, institutional capacities and potential pilot areas. First ULG meetings were used to challenge preliminary assumptions and assess which EPIU components were already present, which could realistically be transferred during the project and which belonged to a longer-term pathway. The resulting Transferability Study therefore became less a prediction of what cities would do and more a shared baseline and working hypothesis for the transfer process. This distinction became important later. **The initial assessment gave all partners a common language and a common map, but it did not lock them into predetermined solutions.**

3.2 Transfer is actually a translation

Once the Good Practice had been unpacked, the next challenge became clear – **understanding EPIU was not the same as being able to reproduce it locally.**


The Transferability Study had already revealed **very different starting positions**. Some partners had existing energy services, advanced digital capacities or established stakeholder ecosystems; others were only beginning to build local knowledge, cooperation and dedicated energy-poverty mechanisms. Even where partners were interested in the same EPIU component, differences in legislation, administrative structures, data access, housing systems, political priorities and available staff meant that implementation could not follow the same route. The partnership therefore adopted a deliberately flexible interpretation of the transfer modules from the beginning.

This also shaped how the network worked. EmPowerIngUs relied on the **EmPowerIngUs Knowledge Local Transfer Process Model** – a combined “Carousel” approach, encouraging cities to learn from one another, with a more “Radial” approach allowing bilateral support and city-specific coaching. Regular online knowledge sessions, thematic transnational meetings, local assignments, ULG discussions and expert support created repeated opportunities to reinterpret what had been learned in Getafe through each city’s own context.

Gradually, transfer became all about asking: **“What function does this component perform, and what would deliver that function in our city?”** This was a critical change. For example, a One-Stop-Shop did not necessarily have to start as a fully staffed new office. Better energy-poverty intelligence did not necessarily have to begin with

AI. Citizen support could be connected to existing social services. Renovation could become the main entry point where housing stock was the most urgent local challenge. Existing Smart City or community-energy initiatives could be connected to energy poverty rather than replaced by a new parallel structure.

The ULGs were intended to play a particularly important role in this translation. They brought municipal departments together with housing actors, social organisations, technical specialists, community representatives and other stakeholders who could judge whether an apparently transferable solution would actually work locally. Their effectiveness varied, as discussed later in this report, but the principle remained central: transnational knowledge only becomes local transfer when someone translates it into the institutional, political and social language of the receiving city.



By mid-term, this process was already changing the original roadmaps. Some ambitions became more concrete, others were narrowed, postponed or connected to different local initiatives. This was not yet the divergence described in Chapter 3.4, but it created the conditions for it.

Transfer therefore became a process of translation: preserving the purpose of the Good Practice while allowing its form, sequencing and delivery mechanism to change.

3.3 Testing before investing

Understanding and translating the Good Practice still left one important problem: many local choices were based on assumptions. EmPowerIngUs used Testing Actions to answer those assumptions before cities committed larger resources. They were deliberately not designed as full-scale pilots, final services or miniature Investment Plans. Instead, they were small, practical experiments used to test a selected uncertainty under real local conditions.

EPIU Good Practice Transfer Maturity Stage		Implementing Partner City	Testing Action
EARLY / LOW-COST EXPLORATORY TESTING	Exploratory service design and data collection testing	Pomorie	"A table, 2 chairs, paper and pen" – testing a future one-stop-shop advisory approach
	Exploratory data testing	Pomorie	Energy data flow and interactive heat mapping
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT & PARTICIPATORY TESTING	Awareness and participation	Trikala	Awareness Raising Event: Understanding and Addressing Energy Poverty
	Community mobilisation	Maia	Testing community mobilisation for Renewable Energy Communities in Maia
STRATEGIC & INSTITUTIONAL TESTING	Evidence-based governance	Maia	Municipal database and Power BI dashboard
	City-scale diagnostic tool	Etterbeek	Aerial thermography of Etterbeek
	Strategic housing assessment	Etterbeek	A long-term renovation pathway for municipal housing
EVOLUTION OF THE EPIU GOOD PRACTICE	Good Practice evolution	Getafe	Upgrading the digital backbone of the One-Stop-Shop
	Good Practice evolution	Getafe	Integrating Energy Communities into the One-Stop-Shop
	Good Practice evolution	Getafe	School of Wellbeing – from energy saving to improved comfort
	Good Practice evolution	Getafe	Energy Kits 2.0 – seasonal redesign and targeted delivery

Their diversity reflected the different maturity levels of the five cities. [The final Testing Actions Catalogue](#) presents 11 selected actions, ranging from very early exploratory testing in Pomorie, through citizen engagement and data-intelligence work in Trikala and Maia, to strategic housing assessment in Etterbeek and further evolution of EPIU's

digital, community-energy and household-support mechanisms in Getafe. **What mattered was not the complexity of Testing Actions, but the clarity they delivered.**

Testing also changed the meaning of “success”. A test did not have to prove that the original idea worked. It could reveal that citizens needed different communication, that a stakeholder partnership was incomplete, that data could not legally be obtained, that more technical capacity was required or that an intervention should be redesigned. Such findings could be just as valuable as confirmation. **In fact, the most useful tests were those that fed directly into a decision.** The Testing Actions Catalogue therefore describes testing as a bridge between transfer and long-term change rather than a side activity of the network.

And this is where the EmPowerIngUs transfer process began to change most visibly. Once assumptions were confronted with local reality, cities no longer had only different starting positions – they increasingly had different evidence on which to base their next choices. **Testing therefore did not tell cities how closely they could reproduce EPIU. It helped them decide which parts made sense to pursue, how they needed to change, and what was worth investing in next.**

3.4 Where transfer paths diverge

EmPowerIngUs began with one Good Practice and a common transfer framework, but it was never expected to end with five identical versions of EPIU. Already during the Transferability Study, differences in existing services, institutional capacity, data availability and local ambition pointed towards a flexible transfer process. As partners moved from understanding the Good Practice to testing it within their own contexts, these differences became increasingly important – and the transfer paths began to diverge.

However, this divergence was not a sign that the network was moving away from the EPIU as a good practice. It was simply the consequence of understanding it better through the EmPowerIngUs Knowledge Local Transfer Process Model we codesigned and successfully implemented.

By mid-term, partners had developed a strong conceptual understanding of the Good Practice, its sequencing and its main components. At the same time, they were becoming more realistic about what transferring these components would require locally. The Mid-Term Review found that partners considered many elements transferable, but also recognised that others depended on significant structural, organisational or financial change. The question therefore shifted from *“Can we reproduce this element of Getafe’s model?”* to *“What function do we actually need, and what is the most realistic way of delivering it here?”*

Testing Actions further accelerated this process and showed that adaptation was not a weakness of transfer but a condition for making it work.

The final transfer assessment makes this learning process visible (see Attachment 1). Around nine out of ten steps originally intended for implementation during the network were completed or developed into activities continuing beyond the project lifetime. Yet the original roadmaps were not implemented unchanged. Some steps were redesigned, others postponed, and a small number cancelled. Reasons included legal and data-protection barriers, limited funding or staff capacity, insufficient operational support, and the need to align transfer with municipal strategies, political decisions and processes developing on different timelines. The matrix therefore records not only progress, but also increasingly informed choices about what was realistic, appropriate and sustainable in each city.

The result is five distinct pathways connected by the same underlying philosophy. Across the four transfer cities, the most productive shift occurred when partners stopped asking which EPIU tool looked most innovative and instead clarified the local barrier they actually needed to overcome.

The following five two-page stories show these pathways in more detail. Each first traces the city’s starting position, local coalition, key adaptations and learning; the second presents the resulting local vision and investment direction. Together, they demonstrate the central lesson of the EmPowerIngUs transfer journey:

“Successful innovative transfer process is not measured by how closely transfer cities reproduce the original good practice, but by how effectively they turn its principles into locally owned, widely accepted and realistic pathways for action.”

TRANSFER PATH OF MAIA (PORTUGAL)

FROM FRAGMENTED CAPACITIES TO AN INTEGRATED MUNICIPAL RESPONSE

Where we started

Maia did not start from scratch. The city already had strong Smart City capacities, an experienced multidisciplinary project team, an existing Energy Hub, active work in the Sobreiro social housing neighbourhood and experience with participatory approaches and European funding. However, these assets were not yet connected into a coherent response to energy poverty. Important barriers included fragmented and insufficient local data, GDPR constraints, limited specialised human resources, lengthy decision-making processes and the challenge of engaging citizens in the energy transition.

What changed along the way

The transfer process gradually shifted Maia's focus from individual projects towards connecting existing municipal capacities. The ULG became an important bridge between the city's internal and external ecosystems. Municipal departments, the housing company, Maia University and other technical partners worked through more focused internal meetings, while decentralised sessions in different parishes brought the discussion closer to communities.


ULG in Maia



ULG Members:
21 / 22 / 23



EmPowerIngUs – Preliminary Analysis of key Stakeholders and Target Groups



Testing helped turn these discussions into practical learning. Maia explored how Renewable Energy Communities could be communicated and mobilised first in Sobreiro and later with a wider audience, while work on the municipal database and Power BI dashboard tested how existing information could become more useful for decision-making. The process also confirmed that some ambitions needed more time: parts of the institutional and data-related transfer were postponed or continue beyond the network lifetime rather than being forced into the project timetable.

Where this led

Maia's final Investment Plan brings these strands together through six connected actions: a Municipal Action Plan for Mitigation of Energy Poverty, an Energy Poverty Study, household energy-efficiency kits, the Maia Solar Renewable Energy Community, a Smart City Unit and the Maia Energy Hub as a future One-Stop-Shop.

TRANSFER IN ONE STATEMENT: Maia did not need to invent new capacities; it needed to connect the ones it already had. EmPowerIngUs helped turn separate Smart City, social-housing, energy and participation initiatives into a coherent investment pathway linking better energy-poverty intelligence with household support, renewable energy communities, a Smart City Unit and a future Energy Hub.



Maia, Portugal

135 306 inhabitants



Challenge

Maia faces a hidden energy poverty crisis. Additionally, 20.8% of the Portuguese population cannot properly heat their homes. Low incomes and ageing inefficient infrastructures trap vulnerable families in cold, unsafe housing conditions.



Local heroes

The URBACT Local Group (ULG) unites our municipal divisions, the public housing company, local academia, energy agencies and several other stakeholders, forming the driving force of this project in Maia. By bringing together technical departments, social services, and community representatives, we ensure that municipal plans translate into immediate, real-world relief for our citizens.



Funding

Sustainable urban transformation requires moving beyond isolated grants toward long-term strategic investment. Combining European and national funding and local resources creates a robust economic framework. This financial integration secures the continuity of local action plans and scales up our transition tools.



The Plan

Integrate data analytics into the municipality

Maia plans to upscale the impact achieved through transnational cooperation by embedding data intelligence directly into our territory. Replicating innovative models allows us to move from reactive social aid to structured, sustainable solutions. Planned improvement activities form a progressive municipal roadmap where social action merges with technological innovation. This long-term framework focuses on expanding clean energy production and creating collaborative community networks to build a more resilient and inclusive municipality.



TRANSFER PATH OF TRIKALA (GREECE)

FROM AN EMERGING ENERGY OFFICE TOWARDS PERMANENT MUNICIPAL SERVICE

Where we started

Trikala entered EmPowerIngUs with unusually strong foundations: long experience in digital governance, an established multidisciplinary municipal ecosystem, ambitious climate-neutrality commitments and an Energy Office already being developed through the Energy4All project. The challenge was therefore not to create an entirely new service, but to ensure that this promising project-based structure could become a stable municipal mechanism for tackling energy poverty. Important gaps remained around permanent funding, institutional anchoring and integration of social, energy and housing data.

What changed along the way



The transfer process helped Trikala move from thinking about the Energy Office mainly as a service point towards seeing it as a wider governance and intelligence function. The ULG expanded and brought together municipal services, e-Trikala, financial actors, technical bodies, the Energy Community of Thessaly and civil-society organisations. This gradually strengthened the idea that the Office should combine citizen support, market facilitation, stakeholder coordination and data-driven policymaking.

ULG in Trikala



ULG Members:

14 / 18 / 21



Testing provided the practical bridge. Trikala moved from awareness-raising and myth-busting activities to targeted work at the Community Centre, a public campaign and eventually direct household engagement. Thirty household visits tested personalised advice and energy monitoring, while 23 citizens expressed interest in smart-meter testing. This progression confirmed that digital capacity alone is not enough: direct contact, trust and personalised support remain essential.

Where this led

The final Investment Plan sets out a 2026–2030 institutionalisation pathway built around four workstreams: stable governance, citizen empowerment and service delivery, market mobilisation and financing, and an Energy Transition Observatory. The preferred Full Institutionalisation Pathway represents an estimated €2.1 million investment, with a leaner alternative retained if external funding is more limited.

TRANSFER IN ONE STATEMENT: Trikala's transfer journey was about moving beyond a project-based Energy Office towards a credible pathway for permanence. EmPowerIngUs helped structure how an already operational service could be progressively embedded through stronger governance, citizen support, financing and data intelligence — while the final step of full institutionalisation still lies ahead.



Trikala, Greece

80 000 inhabitants



Challenge

Trikala addressed the challenge of low awareness and understanding of energy poverty among citizens, including its hidden forms, its causes, its social and economic impacts, as well as available mitigation measures. Addressing this challenge is essential for strengthening local engagement, building a well-informed and engaged community.



Local heroes

The Departments of Social Welfare and Technical Services of the Trikala City Council, e-Trikala S.A., the Municipal Water Company, and the Chamber of Commerce have been the true local heroes. By aligning social policy, technological innovation, and climate goals, Trikala is creating a model for municipal action capable of addressing complex sustainability challenges in a comprehensive manner.



Funding

Three guiding principles: Efficiency in generating quantifiable social and environmental benefits. Diversification to avoid reliance on a single source of funding (municipal, regional, national, and European). Financial and environmental sustainability: the Energy Office must remain operational and maintain low carbon emissions over the long term.



The Plan

A climate-neutral, smart city that leaves no one behind.

The establishment of the Energy Office of Trikala as a stable, municipally anchored public service is the primary objective of this Investment Plan. The Energy Office of Trikala marks a significant milestone in the city's trajectory, as a permanent municipal mechanism designed to address and reduce energy poverty, improve energy efficiency, and empower citizens to participate actively in the city's climate-neutral future. The Plan represents a strategic roadmap for institutional innovation, by linking digital governance, social policy, and sustainable energy management.



TRANSFER PATH OF POMORIE (BULGARIA)

FROM LIMITED LOCAL CAPACITY TO A PRACTICAL, PEOPLE-CENTRED RESPONSE

Where we started

Pomorie started from one of the network's most challenging positions. The municipality had no dedicated energy-poverty service, very limited local data on vulnerable households and relatively weak cooperation between the departments and actors needed to tackle such a cross-cutting issue. At the same time, its ageing housing stock, vulnerable groups and strongly seasonal economy created very specific local pressures. The original ambition was therefore as much about building capacity and cooperation as transferring individual EPIU tools.

What changed along the way



Pomorie deliberately started small. Its ULG built on existing Local Action Group and Fisheries Local Action Group structures, giving the project an immediate community-based platform and maintaining regular stakeholder involvement throughout the Investment Plan process. Internally, cooperation between municipal departments improved and energy poverty became a more concrete municipal issue rather than an abstract concept.

ULG in Pomorie



ULG Members:

14 / 14 / 14



Testing captured the spirit of this pathway particularly well. The first One-Stop-Shop experiment required little more than “a table, two chairs, paper and a pen”. A second test placed an energy-poverty manager close to social services to collect “small data” directly from citizens. At the same time, the municipality pursued access to energy-consumption data for a more ambitious data lake and heat map. When permission could not be secured during the project because of data-protection constraints, the team did not stop: it used social audits, household visits, building energy audits and other available sources instead.

Where this led

Pomorie ultimately broadened rather than narrowed the transferred model and created new spaces for discussion in the city. Its Investment Plan combines a horizontal One-Stop-Shop with interventions at household, building and neighbourhood levels, and adds transport vulnerability as a fourth locally defined scale. The plan therefore reflects both lessons from Getafe and the realities of a municipality where energy, mobility, seasonal employment and territorial accessibility are closely connected.

TRANSFER IN ONE STATEMENT: Pomorie shows the power of starting small: from almost no dedicated data or services, simple testing, stronger municipal cooperation and direct contact with citizens created the foundations for a much broader local model – one that now links energy poverty with housing, community energy and even transport vulnerability.



Pomorie, Bulgaria

15 230 inhabitants



Challenge

More than 35% of households in the country are energy vulnerable. Households face energy vulnerability due to a combination of low average incomes, inefficient housing, and a heavy reliance on electricity, firewood, or coal for heating. Older apartment buildings are poorly insulated and require more energy to stay warm.



Local heroes

Pomorie local heroes group builds on the existing Local Action Groups in the municipality, bringing together public and private stakeholders to promote community-led local development. The Fisheries Local Action Group and the Pomorie Local Action Group. Both follow a bottom-up, EU-supported approach to develop economic, social and environmental projects.



Funding

Implementation of energy efficiency measures in residential buildings and energy communities. Promotion of the purchase of energy-efficient appliances and investments in energy efficiency. Organisation and awareness-raising initiatives. These actions can be supported through a combination of regional development programmes, together with EEA and Norway Grants, the EU LIFE Programme, the Social Climate Fund, and other complementary funds aimed at promoting energy efficiency, climate action, and social inclusion.



The Plan

The Power of Small Scale

Pomorie started with simple resources but a clear vision: to bring the fight against energy poverty closer to those who need it most. Through pilot testing, citizen engagement, cooperation with social services and data-driven work, the municipality took its first steps towards turning an idea into a useful, participatory and future-oriented local service.

The power of small-scale initiatives is taking shape in the form of a nascent one-stop shop, a focus on small data over big data, and the creation of channels of communication between the municipality and the energy supplier that operates nationwide.



TRANSFER PATH OF ETTERBEEK (BELGIUM)

FROM MANY POSSIBLE ENTRY POINTS TO ONE STRATEGIC HOUSING INVESTMENT

Where we started

Etterbeek entered the network with considerable experience rather than an institutional vacuum. It already had political support, an Energy Unit, Proxibat services, established ways of reaching vulnerable residents and a strong network of local actors. The challenge was different: limited data, GDPR restrictions, scarce specialised staff and financial constraints made it unrealistic to transfer every aspect of EPIU at once. The initial transfer vision therefore remained relatively broad, including improved services, small-data collection, awareness-raising and potentially more advanced data approaches later on.



What changed along the way

Over time, the transfer process helped Etterbeek gain focus. Transnational exchanges and the ULG gradually concentrated attention on the Régie Foncière, where energy poverty, an ageing municipal housing stock and mandatory future energy-performance requirements converged into one tangible policy challenge. Rather than treating renovation as a purely technical compliance exercise, the city began structuring it through the EPIU logic: understand vulnerability, engage tenants and then invest.

ULG in Etterbeek



ULG Members:
16 / 16 / 16



This also required revisiting earlier assumptions. Monitoring individual energy poverty had initially been set aside because of privacy and resource constraints, but collaboration with Sibelga and the specific legal position of the Régie Foncière reopened the possibility of doing this at least partially. In parallel, the city commissioned a strategic energy audit of the municipal housing stock and prepared targeted tenant-awareness work. The audit goes beyond energy labels by comparing renovation scenarios, costs, comfort implications and future regulatory requirements.

Where this led

The final Investment Plan concentrates on three mutually reinforcing preparatory actions: identifying hidden energy poverty among tenants, improving energy awareness and establishing a strategic renovation pathway. Together, they are intended to de-risk and socially optimise a future €10–15 million renovation programme for the municipal housing stock.

TRANSFER IN ONE STATEMENT: Etterbeek's strongest transfer result was focus: EmPowerIngUs helped turn a broad set of possible energy-poverty actions into a clear investment logic in which tenant vulnerability, behaviour and building performance are considered together – preparing a mandatory housing-renovation challenge to become a socially targeted €10–15 million public investment.



Etterbeek, Belgium

49 775 inhabitants



Challenge

Etterbeek sought to address energy poverty — which affected 21.8% of Belgians in 2024 — for both socio-economic and environmental reasons. The EmPowerIngUs network enabled the municipality to better identify energy poverty and improve the living conditions of its most vulnerable residents.



Local heroes

We can all, as civil servants, be local heroes when we embrace collective commitment, transparent communication, and efficient, trustful collaboration. With the support of all the municipal services, Etterbeek's housing agency will certainly accomplish great achievements that improve its tenants' living conditions.



Funding

A phased financing strategy is proposed, combining complementary tools aligned with project maturity and municipal capacity. Key levers include bank loans, regional subsidies, crowdlending, federal programmes, and European funds such as ERDF, LIFE, Interreg, and New European Bauhaus. The European Investment Bank could become a strategic long-term partner.



The Plan

When strategy becomes our lighthouse

Our project combines awareness-raising, energy renovation, and strategic planning to improve the energy performance of the municipal dwellings managed by Etterbeek's housing agency (Régie Foncière). We aim to achieve an EPC label C by 2033. This objective is both essential and ambitious, as more than 40% of the current housing stock is rated E, F, or G. To support this transition, a comprehensive energy audit is being developed to help prioritise renovation works. In addition, we will monitor energy consumption and identify situations of energy poverty through relevant data analysis. Workshops with tenants will also help raise awareness on the rational use of energy.



TRANSFER PATH OF GETAFE (SPAIN)

FROM PROVEN GOOD PRACTICE TO A BROADER AND MORE PERMANENT ECOSYSTEM

Where we started

Getafe entered EmPowerIngUs from a fundamentally different position. EPIU was already a recognised URBACT Good Practice, with an operational Intelligence Unit, the Healthy Homes Office and tailor-made measures operating across household, building and neighbourhood scales. The task was therefore to use the project to continue developing, testing, updating and scaling what had already been created, while sharing the model with four very different cities and proving its transferability.



What changed along the way

During the project EMSV managed to widen the ecosystem around EPIU. Getafe's ULG built on partnerships created under the original project and continued expanding links between municipal departments, universities, public companies, social organisations, neighbourhood associations, the Red Cross and the emerging Getafe Potencia energy community. By 2026, the ULG was reenforced with new external partners, bringing new solutions and jointly evolving the Good Practice, connecting energy vulnerability with urban regeneration, health, climate adaptation and wider municipal strategies.

ULG in Getafe



ULG Members:
31 / 31 / 38



Testing and continuous work also shifted the emphasis from preserving individual EPIU outputs towards creating a progressive chain of upgrades. Data management moved from stand-alone records towards an integrated digital system; the One-Stop-Shop expanded towards energy-community support; grant mechanisms were reconsidered; the former Energy School evolved into a School of Wellbeing; health coordination was introduced through cooling and heating plans; and Energy Kits were redesigned around seasonal needs. The Testing Actions Catalogue describes these as evidence of how a mature One-Stop-Shop can continue evolving rather than remain fixed.

Where this led

The Continuity Plan organises seven Upgrade Activities into a logical sequence from better data and digital infrastructure to new services, citizen empowerment and direct household action. Beyond these actions, the emerging Getafe Energy Poverty Hub provides a longer-term platform for preserving and expanding the knowledge generated through both EPIU and EmPowerIngUs.

TRANSFER IN ONE STATEMENT: For Getafe, transfer became a test of continuity and evolution: explaining EPIU to four other cities went hand in hand with strengthening its own local ecosystem and turning a successful innovation into a broader, more connected and increasingly permanent platform for data-driven social action.



Getafe, Spain

193 238 inhabitants



Challenge

Participating in European initiatives has transformed Getafe's strategy to combat energy poverty through data-driven social initiatives. Sharing these initiatives within a transnational innovation network is the best way to continue this work.



Local heroes

The involvement of various departments within the Getafe City Council and public companies, institutions such as the Getafe Red Cross, universities (UC3M and UPM), the Naturgy Foundation, social and neighbourhood associations, and energy communities has been what has truly sustained the project at the local level.



Funding

The current situation shows us that innovation cannot depend on grants and subsidies. Empowerment also means embracing blended finance, combining the vast existing resources in a way that specifically aligns with our strategies. URBACT, EUI, and LIFE CET fund knowledge, HORIZON improves municipal services and directly benefits citizens, while MUNICIPAL BUDGETS ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of the tools acquired. We have moved from isolated projects to SCALABLE FUNDING STRATEGIES.



The Plan

Gearing up with new weapons to combat energy poverty

The ultimate goal is to expand the impact achieved through previous innovative initiatives—not only over time but also geographically—while refining the original activities. Sharing our practices abroad also helps us expand them within Getafe.

The improvement activities carried out by the EMSV and the Getafe City Council form a progressive roadmap, in which each action builds on or enables the next, combining technology, data management, citizen participation, and social action to reduce energy vulnerability in the municipality.



3.5 What did the network add?

As testified by the previous chapter, by the end of EmPowerIngUs, the five cities were following visibly different pathways. This raises an important question: *“If successful transfer meant increasing local adaptation, what was the added value of doing it together as a network?”*

The answer is not hidden in any single approach, tool or methodology, but rather in **the learning environment** created by combining them. EmPowerIngUs was designed as a sequence: understanding Getafe’s Good Practice, analysing local starting positions, building ULGs, exchanging knowledge through thematic transnational meetings and online sessions, testing selected assumptions locally, reflecting on progress, and gradually translating this learning into Investment and Continuity Plans. This structure meant that partners did not have to make their most important transfer decisions at the beginning. They could revisit them as their understanding improved.

The Mid-Term Review provides useful evidence that this was working. All five partners rated their network experience as either very good or excellent, with an average score of 4.4 out of 5. More importantly, they identified tangible local benefits: new skills and knowledge, new working processes, stronger stakeholder engagement, increased political support and improved cross-departmental cooperation. **Partners particularly valued seeing how other partners work and being able to compare different administrative realities, rather than learning only from the original Good Practice.**

This peer dimension became increasingly important as the paths diverged. Cities did not simply compare themselves with Getafe; they also observed one another confronting similar questions from very different positions. A data problem in one city, difficulties engaging citizens in another, delays linked to staffing or related projects elsewhere, or a different interpretation of the One-Stop-Shop all became learning material for the whole partnership. **Seeing these differences unfold in parallel helped transfer partners understand that adaptation was legitimate.** *The relevant question was no longer “Are we doing what Getafe did?”, but “Are we preserving the purpose of the Good Practice while making it work here?”* This is also reflected in the final phase of the network, where increasingly different Investment Plans nevertheless showed convergence around a common set of principles.

The ULGs were the bridge between this transnational learning and local ownership. Their role went well beyond organising participation. They connected municipal departments with social services, housing actors, technical experts, civil society, citizens and other relevant organisations; tested whether ideas made sense locally; helped identify operational barriers; and progressively connected the emerging Investment Plans with the actors expected to support their implementation. The evolution of the ULG stakeholder maps shown in the previous pages therefore tells an important part of the transfer story. The network provided knowledge and comparison, but local groups helped turn this into locally negotiated choices.

This being said, like in any other project, **not everything worked out as planned. The ULG experience for example was not equally strong in every part of the network.** Above-described ULGs potential was not always used to the fullest extent. At mid-term, only Trikala described its ULG as fully active and involving all key stakeholders; the other cities reported groups that were active but still needed support, with some important actors absent or insufficiently engaged. Political changes, competing workloads and the difficulty of sustaining interest around a complex topic all affected continuity. Several cities subsequently adjusted their ULG composition or working formats, but the experience showed that establishing a stakeholder group is much easier than maintaining an active co-production space throughout the whole transfer process.

A similar unevenness appeared in the technical dimension of the transfer. The Lead Partner and Lead expert originally expected stronger involvement of local data specialists, particularly around the big-data and AI components of EPIU. In practice, only Maia and Trikala involved such expertise systematically during the first part of the transfer, while other cities engaged with this component more selectively. This limited the depth with which some partners could explore the original data-driven model. At the same time, it ultimately contributed to an important learning point: cities need enough technical capacity to make an informed choice about advanced data solutions, even if their final decision is to pursue a simpler, locally more appropriate approach.

Another important contribution was **the ability to learn from uncertainty instead of hiding it.** The Mid-Term Review deliberately created a moment to distinguish conceptual understanding from operational readiness and to adjust support accordingly. Testing then gave partners permission to work with small, unfinished ideas before committing to larger solutions. The network provided repeated opportunities to discuss what did not work as expected, why something had been delayed, or why an original assumption needed to change. This made the transfer process more realistic rather than less ambitious.

Finally, **learning was not one-directional**. Getafe entered the network as the source of the Good Practice, but explaining EPIU to cities with different systems and priorities required the Lead Partner to unpack its own decisions, assumptions and experiences. The original Transferability Study already anticipated that knowledge from transfer partners could contribute to further EPIU development, and this became increasingly explicit as the network progressed. As Getafe's Project Manager Fernando González Ferreira later reflected: *"Being required to verbalise and explain EPIU became an opportunity for Getafe itself to revisit and better understand what it had created, get inspired by transfer cities responses and further evolve the Good Practice itself."*

The network therefore added much more than just access to a successful Good Practice. It created a structured environment in which cities could understand it, question it, test it, compare their experience and gradually make it their own – while the experience of explaining, challenging and reinterpreting EPIU across different local realities also contributed to the further reflection and evolution of the Good Practice itself. Furthermore, the lessons emerging from this two-way learning process reach beyond the focus topic of energy poverty – they speak to how urban innovation can travel between cities without losing its core purpose, while continuing to evolve through the very process of transfer.

4. OUR LESSONS LEARNED

The five pathways described in the previous chapter are different, but they are not disconnected. Looking across the Transferability Study, Quarterly Network Journals, Mid-Term Review, Testing Actions Catalogue, Investment and Continuity Plans and the final transfer assessment, **a consistent set of the following “lessons learned” emerges – practical conclusions from the EmPowerIngUs experience**, relevant to cities transferring EPIU, but also to urban practitioners trying to adapt complex innovations developed elsewhere.

4.1 Lesson 1. Transfer principles, not blueprints

EmPowerIngUs started by breaking EPIU into modules and development steps so that partners could understand how its data, services, stakeholder cooperation and interventions fitted together. This proved useful as a learning framework, but not as a replication checklist. Different legal systems, institutional capacities, data environments and local needs inevitably changed how individual elements could be implemented. What travelled most successfully were therefore the principles behind EPIU: understanding vulnerability, combining social and technical knowledge, working across institutional boundaries, creating trusted access to support and tailoring interventions to real needs.

For other cities, the lesson is simple: understand the architecture of the original innovation thoroughly, but do not confuse fidelity with similarity. A successful transfer may look very different while still remaining faithful to the purpose of the Good Practice.

4.2 Lesson 2. Start with the challenge, not the tool

Innovative projects naturally attract attention to their most visible solutions. In EPIU, this could easily mean AI modelling, a One-Stop-Shop, energy kits or renovation measures. EPIU itself showed why this is the wrong place to start – and this was fully adopted by the EmPowerIngUs project.

The transfer cities made most progress when they first asked what local challenge needed to be solved. Etterbeek ultimately centred its pathway on municipal housing renovation and tenant vulnerability. Pomorie first needed basic capacity, trusted contact with vulnerable residents and usable local information. Maia needed to connect existing municipal capacities. Trikala needed to give a developing Energy Office a credible institutional future. The relevant tools followed from these challenges rather than the other way around.

This also explains why an element that appears central in the original Good Practice may legitimately become secondary elsewhere. The Midterm Review showed this particularly clearly for advanced data and AI: all partners recognised the value of data, but not all had the capacity, access or reason to prioritise the same technological pathway.

The key transferability question is therefore not “Which EPIU tool should we implement?” but “What prevents us from addressing energy poverty effectively, and which combination of solutions could remove that barrier?”

4.3 Lesson 3. Test uncertainty before investing in solutions

Testing Actions proved valuable because they were not miniature projects designed to demonstrate success. Their purpose was to reduce uncertainty before larger decisions were taken. Cities tested whether citizens would engage, whether local actors could cooperate, whether available data could become useful intelligence and whether proposed services or interventions were realistic. Even small tests – including Pomorie's deliberately simple One-Stop-Shop experiment for example – produced useful information when they were linked to a concrete decision.

Unexpected results were therefore not necessarily failures. Low participation, inaccessible data or a service format needing redesign could prevent a municipality from investing prematurely in the wrong solution. The strongest Testing Actions were those that clearly informed the next step decision.

Testing should therefore be designed backwards from a decision: “What uncertainty must we reduce before we can responsibly take the next step?”

4.4 Lesson 4. Perfect data is not a prerequisite for acting on energy poverty

Data remained central to the EPIU philosophy, but EmPowerIngUs showed that cities do not need sophisticated AI or complete datasets before they can act. Partners started from very different levels of data availability and technical capacity and used different combinations of municipal information, household surveys, social-service data, building evidence and direct contact with residents.

At the same time, the network encountered real limitations: GDPR issues, ownership of consumption data, interoperability and lack of specialised staff restricted what some cities could do. In Pomorie, one planned data-related transfer step was ultimately cancelled because of legal barriers.

The lesson is to sequence ambition: begin with the best legally and operationally usable information available, learn how to use it well, and build more sophisticated intelligence over time.

4.5 Lesson 5. Trust is part of the infrastructure

Energy poverty involves income, housing conditions, health, comfort and vulnerability – issues that people may be reluctant to discuss with public authorities. EmPowerIngUs repeatedly showed that technically sound solutions depend on trusted human relationships. Social services, community organisations, neighbourhood actors and accessible municipal staff often provided the bridge between a public service and the households it hoped to reach.

Trust also mattered inside institutions. ULGs and cross-departmental cooperation depended on actors being willing to share information, responsibilities and uncertainty. Communication was therefore not simply a promotional activity added after designing a service; it formed part of the intervention itself.

Cities should plan, staff and resource trust just as deliberately as technical infrastructure. A good service that people do not understand or trust will struggle to reach those who need it most.

4.6 Lesson 6. The hardest innovation is often institutional

Many of EPIU's most visible innovations are technological or service-based, but the transfer process showed that the harder change often lies inside municipal organisation. Energy poverty cuts across social services, housing, energy, climate, health, data, finance and urban development – functions that usually sit in separate departments and organisations. As the final transfer assessment shows, several constraints were institutional rather than technical.

Proving that often the real innovation is not a new tool or solution, but the institutional relationships that allow it to function and survive.

4.7 Lesson 7. Design continuity from the beginning

EmPowerIngUs confirmed that sustainability cannot be left until the final months of a project. Questions about ownership, institutional anchoring, implementation partnerships, funding and long-term responsibility need to shape the transfer from an early stage.

The final assessment also shows that activities continuing beyond the network lifetime should not automatically be read as incomplete transfer. The Investment and Continuity Plans provide the bridge between learning during EmPowerIngUs and what partners intend to do next.

From the beginning, cities should ask: “Who will own this afterwards, where will it sit institutionally, what resources will it require and what would make somebody continue funding it?”

4.8 Lesson 8. Transfer changes the Good Practice too

EmPowerIngUs showed that innovation transfer is not necessarily a one-way process from a city that “knows” to cities that “learn”. At the same time, experience from the transfer cities fed back into discussions about the further development of EPIU itself.

This does not mean that every later change in Getafe was caused by the network. But the evidence does support a more careful conclusion: the transfer process created an additional space for reflection, comparison and refinement of the original Good Practice.

For Lead Partners, sharing an innovation can therefore become another stage of innovation itself: transfer can change not only the receiving cities, but also the Good Practice being transferred – they just have to be willing to further evolve.

5. OUR NEXT STEPS

The EmPowerIngUs project ends with five different local pathways, but not with five finished stories. In all partner cities, important parts of the transfer continue beyond the lifetime of the network. The Investment and Continuity Plans therefore represent not an end point, but a bridge between the learning generated through EmPowerIngUs and the next phase of local implementation.

GETAFE – NEXT STEPS

Consolidating and evolving EPIU

1 DATA & DIGITAL

Strengthen data quality, integration and digital tools for better insight and decision-making.

2 EXPANDED SERVICES

ONE-STOP-SHOP

Grow and connect services through a one-stop-shop for all energy-related information and support.

Information Advice Financial Support Efficiency

WE'RE HERE TO HELP!

3 CITIZEN EMPOWERMENT

Enable residents and communities to take action, share knowledge and lead local solutions.

4 HOUSEHOLD SUPPORT

Provide tailored support to reduce energy bills, improve comfort and increase energy efficiency.

5 ENERGY POVERTY HUB

Build a long-term platform that preserves and extends the knowledge, tools and collaborations from EPIU and EmPowerIngUs.

Share knowledge and best practices
Foster collaboration across sectors
Support innovation and replication

★ 7 Upgrade Activities in the Continuity Plan ★

MAIA – NEXT STEPS

From connected capacities to implementation

1 ACTION PLAN

Develop and deliver the Municipal Action Plan for Mitigation of Energy Poverty.

2 ENERGY POVERTY STUDY

Deepen understanding through research, data analysis and new insights.

3 HOUSEHOLD SUPPORT

Provide personalised advice and support to help households improve comfort and reduce bills.

WE'RE HERE TO HELP!

4 MAIA SOLAR

Expand solar solutions and community energy projects for an affordable and sustainable future.

TOGETHER WE SHARE ENERGY

5 SMART CITY UNIT

Use data and digital tools to monitor, target and improve energy services and impact.

6 MAIA ENERGY HUB

Strengthen the one-stop-shop for energy services, partnerships and citizen engagement.

ADVICE SOLUTIONS FUNDING PARTNERS TRAINING

ONE STOP. MANY SOLUTIONS.

Important note Some institutional and data-related elements will continue beyond the network timetable to ensure lasting impact.

★ From plan to impact – together we make energy fair and future-ready. ★

TRIKALA – NEXT STEPS

Towards a permanent Energy Office

1 2026-2030 PATHWAY

A clear roadmap for consolidating and expanding energy support in Trikala.

2026 2027 2028 2029 2030

STRONGER TODAY, SUSTAINABLE TOMORROW

2 ENERGY OFFICE

The Energy Office is already operational – providing guidance, advice and support to citizens.

WE CAN SAVE ENERGY!

ADVICE SUPPORT GUIDANCE

3 STABLE GOVERNANCE

Strong collaboration between the Municipality and key stakeholders ensures continuity, transparency and accountability.

Municipality Social Services NGOs & Partners Local Community

4 FUNDING & PERMANENCE

Long-term permanence depends on securing stable funding.

BUDGET PLAN

EU FUNDS NATIONAL FUNDS MUNICIPAL BUDGET PARTNERSHIPS

5 DATA INTEGRATION & SERVICES

Integrate data, improve services and scale impact together with citizens and stakeholders – for continued development as a municipal service.

ENERGY DASHBOARD

1,245 HOUSEHOLDS 3.2 GWh SAVED 850 t CO₂ REDUCED

CITIZENS STAKEHOLDERS

MUNICIPAL SERVICE THAT KEEPS IMPROVING

★ Institutionalising the Energy Office ★

POMORIE – NEXT STEPS

Consolidating local capacity

1 BUILT CAPACITY

Strengthening the municipal team and local partnerships to lead energy poverty solutions.

Trained staff Strong partners Ready to act

2 ONE-STOP-SHOP

A simple access point for information, advice and support on energy solutions and available aid.

WE'RE HERE TO HELP!

ADVICE GUIDANCE FUNDING INFO FOLLOW-UP

POMORIE ENERGY SUPPORT CENTRE

3 HOUSEHOLD ACTIONS

Helping households reduce bills, improve comfort and access support.

Energy advice Small upgrades Efficient appliances Access to available aid

4 BUILDING & NEIGHBOURHOOD

Supporting efficient buildings and cleaner, stronger communities.

Building upgrades Better public spaces Community engagement

5 TRANSPORT VULNERABILITY

Addressing the locally defined transport dimension of energy poverty.

Better public transport Affordable mobility Inclusive access

The Investment Plan provides the framework for this next phase of implementation.

Clear priorities Local ownership Smart investment Stronger impact

★ Working together for a fair, warm and sustainable Pomorie. ★

ETTERBEEK – NEXT STEPS

From knowledge to housing renovation

1 IDENTIFY ENERGY POVERTY

Use local data to locate households at risk and understand their situation.

DATA

2 TENANT ENGAGEMENT

Listen, inform and co-create solutions with residents. Trust and dialogue first.

3 STRATEGIC ENERGY AUDIT

Assess buildings and systems to define the right priorities.

AUDIT

HEATING VENTILATION HOT WATER ELECTRICITY

4 RÉGIE FONCIÈRE HOUSING

Strengthen and expand municipal housing to ensure decent, affordable and sustainable homes.

PUBLIC & AFFORDABLE HOUSING

5 SOCIALLY TARGETED RENOVATION

Invest in energy efficiency while addressing social vulnerability and tenant needs.

Technical investment that also responds to social vulnerability and tenant needs.

PREPARING FUTURE HOUSING RENOVATION INVESTMENT

BETTER DATA + STRONGER PARTNERSHIPS + SMART FUNDING + FAIR & INCLUSIVE SOLUTIONS = COMFORTABLE HOMES FOR ALL

Across all five cities, the same message emerges: the end of the network is not the end of transfer. Some of the most important changes identified through EmPowerIngUs – institutionalisation, long-term service development, data systems, investment programmes and implementation partnerships – naturally require more time than a two-year transfer network can provide. The real test of continuity will therefore be whether the locally owned pathways developed through EmPowerIngUs remain connected to municipal priorities, responsible institutions, available resources and the stakeholders expected to carry them forward.

6. FOR CONCLUSION – A ROADMAP FOR OTHER CITIES TO FOLLOW

EmPowerIngUs began with a question about whether a complex Good Practice developed in one city could work elsewhere. Two years later, the answer is clear: yes – but not as a fixed package.

The network experience suggests a simple pathway for cities interested in transferring complex urban innovation:




What travelled most successfully was not a single tool, database, service or institutional structure. It was a **way of working**: understanding people and their homes, creating useful knowledge from both “big” and “small” data, building trust, working across institutional boundaries, connecting soft and hard solutions, testing before investing and remaining willing to adapt – **resulting in five different pathways rooted in a shared philosophy.**

Perhaps this is the most important legacy of EmPowerIngUs: **Successful transfer preserves the purpose of innovation without freezing its form. When cities are willing to understand, test, adapt and learn from one another, a well-managed transfer process can create the conditions for innovation to continue evolving.**



EPIU Getafe
Hogares saludables



EmPowerIngUs

ATTACHMENT 1: Final Transfer Progress Self-assessment

Meaning of the assessment signs from the Transferability Study:

+	TC has already achieved this GP step on its-own	+	TC will implement this GP step within the project	LTT	TC will implement this GP step within the long-term transfer	?	TC needs to know more before it can decide	-	TC will not implement this GP step
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Meaning of the assessment signs for the purpose of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) Process

C	Completed	D	Delayed, but will be completed within the project	X	Cancelled	IP	In progress
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Meaning of the assessment signs for the purpose of the Final Transfer Progress Self-assessment

C	Completed	CON	On-going effort being continued beyond the project lifetime	P	Postponed, TC will implement this GP step within the long-term transfer	X	Cancelled
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GOOD PRACTICE MODULES		GOOD PRACTICE DEVELOPMENT STEPS	GETAFE			MAIA			TRIKALA			POMORIE			ETTERBEEK		
			2/2025	10/2025	6/2026	2/2025	10/2025	6/2026	2/2025	10/2025	6/2026	2/2025	10/2025	6/2026	2/2025	10/2025	6/2026
INITIAL TRANSFER	Active partnership establishment and management	1) Identification of key stakeholders	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
		2) Mobilization of key stakeholders (1 st autonomous meeting)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
		3) Building enthusiastic atmosphere and providing support on regular meetings	+	+	+	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	+	+	+	IP	C
		4) Identification of individual stakeholder goals, capacities and preparedness for cooperation	+	+	+	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	C	C
		5) Definition of a yearly TC Roadmap, roles and responsibilities	+	+	+	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	C	C
		6) Guidance in yearly TC Roadmap implementation	+	+	+	+	C	C	+	IP	C	+	C	C	+	IP	C
		7) Investment/Continuity Plan development	+	IP	C	+	IP	C	+	IP	C	+	IP	C	+	IP	C
		8) Forming the Investment/Continuity Plan implementation partnership	+	IP	C	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT
	Knowledge transfer	1) Nominating the ULG coordinator	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
		2) ULG management training	+	+	+	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	C	C
		3) Nominating the Energy poverty manager position or Energy poverty reduction team within the city administration (testing activity)	+	+	+	+	IP	P	+	IP	C	+	C	C	+	+	+
		4) In-depth understanding on the EPIU big-data & AI modelling solutions and results	+	+	+	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	C	C
		5) In-depth understanding on the EPIU one-stop-shop mechanism (HHO)	+	+	+	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	C	C
		6) In-depth understanding on the EPIU energy poverty measures on all 3 levels	+	+	+	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	C	C
	Encouraging and improving cooperation within city administration	1) Definition of key administration departments/sectors and their roles	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
		2) Gaining operational support	+	+	+	+	D	CON	+	IP	C	+	+	+	+	IP	
		3) On-going communication with city administration (briefing -potentially on weekly/monthly basis in order to keep CEOs informed and involved)	+	+	+	+	D	CON	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	+	+
		4) Developing new activities for energy poverty reduction with integration into the strategic urban context	+	+	+	+	C	C	+	IP	C	+	IP	CON	+	IP	C
		5) Identifying opportunities for synergies with other on-going initiatives	+	C	C	+	C	C	+	IP	C	+	C	C	+	IP	C
		6) Strengthening political support for Investment/Continuity Plan	+	C	C	+	IP	CON	+	IP	CON	+	IP	C	+	IP	CON
	Preliminary testing with first and second level data collection	1) Collection of all exiting and relevant data on the topic of energy poverty (relevant local/regional/national level data)	+	+	+	+	IP	CON	+	D	CON	+	IP	X (legal barriers)	+	IP	CON
		2) Defining types of data and method of its collection from citizen (testing activity)	+	+	+	+	IP	P	+	IP	C	+	C	C	+	D	C
		3) Setting-up preliminary testing activities (testing activity)	+	+	+	+	C	C	+	D	C	+	C	C	+	IP	C
		4) Announcement and promotion of testing activities (testing activity)	+	+	+	+	C	C	+	D	C	+	C	C	+	D	C
		5) Collection of own data through surveys with creation of profiles (testing activity)	+	+	+	+	IP	CON	+	D	C	+	C	C	+	IP	CON
		6) Reporting on testing activities results	+	+	+	+	IP	C	+	D	C	+	C	C	+	IP	C

LONG-TERM TRANSFER	Awareness raising		1) Identification of target groups	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		
			2) Communication and awareness rising strategy	+	D	C	+	D	C	+	D	C	+	D	C	+	D	C	
			3) Development of communication tools (web site, social networks, local news, etc.)	+	+	+	+	C	C	+	IP	C	+	C	C	+	D	C	
			4) Regular publication of news and contents, giving interviews, etc.	+	+	+	+	C	C	+	IP	C	+	C	C	+	D	C	
			5) Organization and implementation of yearly awareness rising and promotional events, exhibitions, lectures, etc.	+	+	+	+	IP	C	+	IP	C	+	IP	C	+	+	+	
			6) Organization of international energy poverty seminars, conferences, etc.	+	C	C	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Development of baseline studies		1) Definition of types of neighbourhoods per key characteristics	+	+	+	+	IP	P	+	?	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	
			2) Energy poverty study	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	+	?	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	
			3) Urban heat island study	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	+	+	+
			4) Other relevant studies	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT
	One-stop shop establishment		1) Hiring or reallocating existing staff to the one-stop shop	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	+	IP	C	LTT	LTT	LTT	+	+	+	
			2) Full-scale energy poverty training of key personnel	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	IP	C	LTT	LTT	LTT	+	+	+	
			3) Ensuring adequate facilities and funds for its preliminary operation	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	+	+	+	
			4) Optimizing its operational model and standard operating procedures based on lessons learned from the testing period	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	+	D	C	LTT	LTT	LTT	+	D	C	
			5) Ensuring adequate facilities and funds for its long-term operation	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	IP	CON	LTT	LTT	LTT	+	+	+	
	One-stop-shop services (soft measures)		Household level	1) Reception of users, data collection and itinerary															
				2) Accompaniment, energy optimization and habits	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	+	+	+
				3) Coordination and monitoring															
			Buildings level	4) Building visits and data collection														IP	CON
				5) Publishing a call for beneficiaries to co-finance solutions	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	+	X (Funding)	X (Funding)
				6) Coordination and monitoring														IP	CON
			Neighbourhoods level	7) Meetings with neighbourhood entities	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT
				8) Identification of necessities	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT
				9) Participated improvement proposals															
	Third party solutions (Hard measures)		Household level	1) Diagnosis: socio-energy audits												+	+	+	
				2) Home scale Decision trees													+	+	+
				3) Cross-validation between measurements reflected in the audit and results of the decision trees.	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	IP	P	LTT	LTT	LTT
				4) Solution execution: Public procurement/execution by a third party													LTT	LTT	LTT
			Buildings level	5) Diagnosis: Preliminary building reform project															
				6) Building scale Decision trees															
				7) Cross-validation between measurements reflected in the preliminary project and results of the decision trees.	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	IP	CON	LTT	LTT	LTT
				8) Solution execution: Public procurement/execution by a third party															
			Neighbourhoods level	9) Diagnosis: Multivariable diagnosis of public space															
				10) Coordination with City involved Council Delegations	+	+	+	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT
				11) Methodology of intervention & definition of actions															
				12) Solution execution: Public procurement/execution by a third party															
	Third level data collection and AI modelling		1) Third level data collection						C	LTT	LTT	LTT	?	?	LTT	LTT	LTT	LTT	
			2) Data warehouse creation						C										
			3) AI model transfer, adaptation and application	+	+	+	+	IP	P										
			4) AI modelling result sharing & publication						P										

		5) AI modelling lessons learned sharing & publication						P									
UP-GRADE	Improved AI modelling	1) Further improvement of AI big data analytics for hidden energy poverty profiling	+	IP	C	+ (only support to LP)	IP	C	+ (only support to LP)	IP	C	+ (only support to LP)	IP	C	+ (only support to LP)	IP	C
		2) Using this data for improved of hidden energy poverty identification			CON												
		3) Development of a Standard Operating Procedure for the controlled use of the “EPIU data-lake”			LTT												
		4) Identification of new opportunities for “EPIU data-lake” use for city administration			C												
	Energy Communities	1) Creating local partnerships	+	IP	C	+ (only support to LP)	IP	C	+ (only support to LP)	IP	C	+ (only support to LP)	IP	C	+ (only support to LP)	IP	C
		2) Identifying best possible locations															
		3) Acquiring all necessary permits & funding															
		4) Establishing first Energy Communities															
		5) Learning from them and exploiting any upscaling potentials															